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Single-Sex Schools and Classroom: 
Is "Separate but Comparable" Legally Permissible? 
Donald F. Uerling 
Gretchen Hall 
Abstract 
Most public schools in the United States have been coeducational, based at least in part on a 
general belief that single-sex schools and classrooms were legally impermissible. Now the issue 
of single-sex education has been raised again by the No Child Left Behind Act of2001, which 
provides that federal funds may be made available to local education agencies for an array of 
innovative assistance programs, including programs to provide same-gender schools and 
classrooms. An analysis of applicable law, coupled with a review of the merits of single-sex 
schooling, suggests that "separate but comparable" single-sex public school education might be 
legally permissible. 
Introduction 
During the past several decades, most public elementary and secondary schools in the United 
States have been coeducational, based at least in part on a general belief that single-sex schools 
and classrooms were legally impermissible. Sadker and Sadker (1994) expressed a common 
point of view: "Today, single-sex schools are an endangered species; they are illegal in the 
public sector and vanishing rapidly from the private sector" (p. 232). The American Association 
of University Women (1998) raised a telling question: Should educators and researchers continue 
to invest their efforts in a strategy-single-sex education-that is of questionable legality? 
Now the issue of single-sex education has been raised again by the No Child Left Behind Act 
of 200 1, which provides that federal funds may be made available to local education agencies for 
an array of innovative assistance programs, among which are included programs to provide 
same-gender schools and classrooms. 
An analysis of applicable statutory and constitutional law reveals some commonly-held 
beliefs about single-sex schooling, and explores the circumstances under which "separate but 
comparable" single-sex education in public elementary and secondary schools might be legally 
permissible. 
Title IX 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides that "[ n]o person in the United 
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or 
be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal 
assistance" (20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), 2001). The federal regulations implementing Title IX state that 
no school receiving federal funds shall "provide any course or otherwise carry out any of its 
education activity separately on the basis of sex" 34 C.F.R. § 106.34 (2002). Reading these two 
provisions together could lead to a conclusion that no public school receiving federal funding is 
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allowed to offer a single-sex education program, whether it be an entire school or a single class 
within a coeducational (mixed gender) school. But contrary to popular belief, nothing in Title IX 
explicitly prohibits single-sex schools. In regard to admissions, the prohibition against 
discrimination based on sex exempts non-vocational elementary and secondary schools (see, 20 
U.S.c. § 1681(a)(1), 2001). 
The Code of Federal Regulations recites the rules promulgated by the u.s. Department of 
Education to carry out the provisions of Title IX. A pertinent provision in these regulations states 
that a local educational agency (LEA) may "exclude any person from admission" to a 
non-vocational elementary or secondary school "on the basis of sex" only if "such recipient 
otherwise makes available to such person, pursuant to the same policies and criteria of 
admission, courses, services, and facilities comparable to each course, service, and facility 
offered in or through such schools" (34 C.F.R. § 106.35(b), 2002). Thus, neither Title IX nor the 
implementing regulations prohibit school districts receiving federal funding from operating 
single-sex schools, but only if those districts provide schools with comparable programs for both 
sexes. 
Although single-sex schools may be permissible under Title IX, most single-sex classes 
within coeducational public schools are not. The general prohibition of sex-based discrimination 
in the statute (see, 20 U.S.C. § 1681,2001), is paralleled by language in the federal regulations, 
(see, 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(a), 2002). The regulations also include a more specific provision 
pertaining to access to course offerings. 
A recipient shall not provide any course or otherwise carry out any of its education program 
or activity separately on the basis of sex, or require or refuse participation therein by any of 
its students on such basis, including health, physical education, industrial, business, 
vocational, technical, home economics, music, and adult education courses. (34 
C.F.R. § 106.34,2002) 
But this section also includes exceptions that may lead to single-sex classes. Among the more 
important are those that permit grouping students in physical education classes and activities by 
ability (Id. at § 1 06.34(b), 2002), separating students by sex in physical education classes or 
sports where the purpose or major part involves bodily contact (Id. at 106.34(c), 2002), 
conducting separate sessions for boys and girls in portions of classes that deal exclusively with 
human sexuality (Id. § 106.34(e), 2002), and having requirements based on vocal range or 
quality that may result in choruses predominantely of one sex (Id. § 106.34(f),2002). 
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 
On January 8, 2002, President George W. Bush signed into law the No Child Left Behind 
Act of2001, which reauthorized the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. One 
section in this massive piece oflegislation provides that federal innovative assistance funds made 
available to local educational agencies may be used to support "[p ]rograms to provide 
same-gender schools and classrooms (consistent with applicable law)" (Id. at § 5131(a)(23), 
2001). 
The Act also required the Secretary of Education to issue, within 120 days, guidelines for 
local education agencies seeking funding for programs described in subsection (a)(23) 
(Id. § 5131 (c), 2001). As directed, the Office for Civil Rights, Department of Education, 
published guidelines on current Title IX requirements related to single-sex classes and schools 
(67 Fed. Reg. 31102, May 8, 2002). These guidelines make clear that the Department believes 
that Title IX and its regulations permit certain kinds of single-sex classes in coeducational 
schools and, if certain conditions are met, single-sex schools within a school system. If a school 
district establishes a single-sex school for one sex to offer a particular program, then the other 
sex must also have access to a comparable school with that curriculum. And, the "comparable 
school" must also be single-sex. 
On that same date, the Department of Education published in the Federal Register a "notice 
of intent to regulate," (67 Fed. Reg. 31098, 2002), which gave notice that the Secretary of 
Education intends to propose amendments to the regulations implementing Title IX that would 
provide more flexibility for educators to establish single-sex classes and schools at the 
elementary and secondary level. 
The purpose of the amendments would be to support efforts of school districts to improve 
educational outcomes for children and to provide public school parents with a diverse array 
of educational options that respond to the educational needs of their children, while at the 
same time ensuring appropriate safeguards against discrimination. (ld. at 31098, 2002) 
The notice invited comments on whether, and under what circumstances, single-sex schools and 
classrooms should be permitted. As this article was being prepared, the Department was 
reviewing the many comments received. 
The notice of intent to regulate stated that the proposed regulations would have to be 
consistent with both Title IX and the Constitution. The Department noted that the Supreme Court 
had decided two constitutional cases that specifically addressed single-sex education, United 
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), and Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 
U.S. 718 (1982). These cases are discussed below. 
Equal Protection Clause 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States provides that no States shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection ofthe laws." The Equal Protection Clause comes into play when some form of 
legislative classification is at issue. To analyze the constitutionality of such classifications, the 
Supreme Court has devised a three-tiered analysis, which it summarized in Plyler v. Doe (1982). 
A legislature must have substantial latitude to establish classifications, and in applying the 
Equal Protection Clause to most forms of state action, the Court seeks only the assurance that the 
classification at issue bears some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose (Id. at 216). This 
is the "rational basis" test, which imposes little difficulty on a government entity. 
The Court treats as presumptively invidious those classifications that disadvantage a "suspect 
class" or that impinge on the exercise of a "fundamental right" for such classifications, the state 
must demonstrate that its classification has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling 
governmental interest (ld. at 216-17). This is the "strict scrutiny" test, which is extremely 
difficult for a government entity to satisfy. 
In addition, certain forms of legislative classification, while not facially invidious, 
nonetheless give rise to recurring constitutional difficulties; in these limited circumstances the 
Court inquires whether the classification may fairly be viewed as furthering a substantial interest 
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of the state (ld. at 217-18). This is the intermediate-level "heightened scrutiny" test, which 
imposes a significant, but not impossible, burden of justification on a government entity. 
For many years, classifications based on sex have been subject to scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause, and state government entities that use such classifications have been required 
to satisfy the intermediate-level "heightened scrutiny" test (see e.g., Craig v. Boren, 1976; 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 1973). Thus, proponents of single-sex schools and classes in public 
school systems should be prepared to demonstrate an educationally sound justification for such 
an arrangement. 
Single-Sex Education in the Courts 
Higher Education 
The United States Supreme Court has rendered two decisions dealing with single-sex 
education at the college level: Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (1982), and 
United States v. Virginia (1996). These two cases offer some insight into the principles that 
probably would guide an equal protection analysis of gender-based classifications in K -12 
schools. 
In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (1982), a male student was excluded, solely 
on the basis of gender, from enrolling in the School of Nursing at the Mississippi University for 
Women. He sued the University, alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that those seeking to uphold a statute 
classifying individuals on the basis of gender must carry the burden of showing an "exceedingly 
persuasive justification" for the classification, a burden that can be met only by showing at least 
that the classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory 
means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives (Hogan at 724). 
The University's arguments for excluding men from the School of Nursing failed to satisfy 
either part of this Equal Protection test. First, the state made no showing that women lacked 
either training or leadership opportunities that needed to be remedied by excluding men; rather 
than compensating for any discriminatory barriers faced by women, the policy of excluding 
males tended to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as exclusively a woman's job. 
Second, the argument that women are adversely affected by the presence of men in the College 
of Nursing was undermined by the policy of permitting men to audit nursing classes. The Court 
held that excluding males from enrolling in the state-supported School of Nursing violated the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
In United States v. Virginia (1996), the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), a prestigious all-
male military college, came under fire for its policy of refusing admission to women. While at 
VMI, male students were engaged in military-type "adversative" training, which was meant to 
encourage them to be leaders in military and civilian life. Strong emphasis was placed on the 
cadet-style training, which included rigorous tests of physical and moral aptitude. The school's 
mISSIon was 
to produce educated and honorable men, prepared for the varied work of civil life, imbued 
with love oflearning, confident in the functions and attitudes ofleadership, possessing a high 
sense of public service, advocates of the American democracy and free enterprise system, 
and ready as citizen-soldiers to defend their country in time of national peril (Id. at 522). 
Prompted by a complaint filed with the Attorney General by a female high school student 
seeking admission to VMI, the United States filed suit against the institution and the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, alleging that the male-only admissions requirement violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court initially ruled in favor 
ofVMI, noting that the government had met its burden of showing the government action based 
on sex met the "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the classification (Id. at 524). Studying 
the benefits of single-gender educational environments, the court reasoned that if having a male-
only educational environment was central to the mission of the school, then the "only means of 
achieving the objective is to exclude women from the all-male institution-VMI" (Id.). The 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed, however, and vacated the lower court's 
judgment. This court emphasized a nondiscrimination commitment undertaken by the 
Commonwealth of Virginia in a 1990 Report that stated, "It is extremely important that colleges 
and universities deal with faculty, staff, and students without regard to sex, race, or ethnic 
origin." (Id. at 525). The Court of Appeals suggested three options for Virginia to consider as 
remedial actions: (a) admit women to VMI, (b) establish parallel institutions or programs, or (c) 
abandon state support, leaving VMI to function as a private institution existing on non-pUblic 
funds. 
Virginia chose the second option suggested by the Court of Appeals and established a 
parallel program at Mary Baldwin College, a private liberal arts school for women. This parallel 
program, Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL), shared much ofVMI's mission to 
produce 'citizen-soldiers'; however, in many respects VWIL was much different from its male 
counterpart. Compared to VMI, VWIL was much smaller, enrolling around 25-30 students, 
maintained a less-prestigious faculty holding fewer Ph.D's than that ofVMI's faculty, and 
offered fewer academic majors. Interestingly enough, a task force of Mary Baldwin faculty 
charged with designing the VWIL program decided that VMI's military model of education 
would be "wholly inappropriate" for VWIL. The stringent adversative experience that bonded 
men on the VMI campus would not be part of the VWIL's program; instead, the focus of 
instruction and training would favor a "cooperative method which reinforces self-esteem" (Id. at 
527). Women at VWIL would participate in a less-stringent ROTC program, which the school 
admitted was "largely ceremonial," and would learn many of the same skills taught through 
high-stress situations at VMI through guest speakers and service projects (Id.). There were also 
large differences in funding; VMI enjoyed an endowment of roughly $131 million, compared to 
Mary Baldwin's endowment of only $19 million. Additionally, the court recognized the wide 
array of alumni contacts available to VMI graduates that helped with employment prospects and 
networking opportunities, both of which were unavailable to graduates ofVWIL's program (Id. 
at 748). 
Virginia returned to the district court seeking approval of its proposed remedial plan. The 
district court decided that the plan satisfied the Equal Protection Clause, anticipating that the two 
schools would achieve substantially similar outcomes; a divided court of appeals affirmed, 
applying a "substantive comparability" test. The United States petitioned for a writ of certiorari, 
and the Supreme Court granted the writ, thus choosing to review the court of appeals decision. 
In United States v. Virginia (1996) the Court confronted two basic issues: First, did Virginia's 
exclusion of women from the unique opportunities offered by VMI deny them equal protection 
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of the law? Second, if exclusion from VMI offended the Constitution, what would be the 
remedial requirement? 
The Court followed the analysis it had set out in Hogan for cases where there is a state 
government classification based on gender: focusing on the differential treatment or denial of 
opportunity, the reviewing court must determine whether the proffered justification is 
"exceedingly persuasive;" the burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the 
state. The state must show at least that the classification serves important governmental interests 
and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those 
objectives. The Court noted that "[t]he justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or 
invented post hoc in response to litigation. And it must not rely on overbroad generalizations 
about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females" (Virginia at 532-33). 
The Court noted, however, that the heightened review standard 
... does not make sex a proscribed classification. Supposed "inherent differences" are no 
longer accepted as a ground for race or national origin classification. [citation deleted] 
Physical differences between men and women, however, are enduring: [T]he two sexes are 
not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one [sex] is different from a community 
composed of both." [citation deleted] (Id. at 533). 
Classifications based on sex may be used to remediate past wrongs against women, but may 
no longer be used "to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women" 
(Id. at 534). 
The Supreme Court found that Virginia had shown no "exceedingly persuasive justification" 
for excluding women from admission to VMI and that the remedy proffered by Virginia-the 
Mary Baldwin VWIL program-did not cure the constitutional violation. 
In addressing the first issue, the Court undertook a study of single-sex education and found 
that it does benefit some students. However, using the rationale presented in Hogan, the Court 
found no link between the goal of the institution and the actual purpose of the discrimination. 
That is, there was no connection between preparing students to enter the world as productive 
citizen-soldiers and the need to exclude women from that educational process. The opinion 
offered an historical summary of women's education in the United States, noting that tradition at 
many colleges had been to discriminate against women. Some of the same arguments offered by 
Virginia had been offered in decades past, including the idea that women would disrupt the 
campus environment, standards would have to be lowered, and the reputation of the school 
would be tarnished. As early as 1970, however, a federal district court confirmed the necessity of 
admitting women to the University of Virginia. Taking the history of Virginia together with the 
state's policy emphasizing diversity, the Court found no connection between the all-male 
admission policy ofVMI and the desire of the state to promote diversity. The Court also noted 
that there were women who could meet the current admissions requirements at VMI, and thus in 
some instances, the only reason some women were denied admission was simply because of their 
gender, not because they could not meet the school's strenuous demands. 
Having found that the exclusion of women from VMI violated the Equal Protection Clause, 
the Court moved to determine what remedial action, ifany, could satisfy the demands of the 
Constitution. The Court found major differences between the education offered to women at 
Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership and that offered to male cadets at Virginia Military 
Institute. Most significant was that the state deliberately did not make VWIL a military-style 
institution, which meant that the women at VWIL would not receive the same benefits of the 
adversative training offered at VMI. 
Virginia offered a rationale for the different approaches to education at the two institutions, 
noting the methodology was "justified pedagogically based on important differences between 
men and women in learning and developmental needs, and psychological and sociological 
differences"(Id. at 549). Virginia relied on the educational judgment of the Mary Baldwin faculty 
that the adversative training offered at VMI was "wholly inappropriate for educating and training 
most women" (Id. at 549). The Court rejected this notion, stating that "generalizations about 'the 
way women are' ... no longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talents and capacity 
place them outside the average description" (Id. at 550). 
The Court found VWIL's program to be unequal to VMI's in a number of other respects. 
First-year students at VWIL scored an average of 100 points less on the SAT than students at 
VMI; the staff at VWIL held fewer Ph.D.s than their faculty counterparts at VMI; there were 
fewer curricular choices for students at VWIL than at VMI; there were fewer physical training 
facilities at VWIL than the expansive practice and training facilities at VMI; there was less 
financial support for students at VWIL than for those at VMI; and graduates of VWIL do not 
enjoy the prestige that goes with being a graduate ofVMI (Id. at 551-52). The Court concluded 
by stating that "Virginia, in sum, while maintaining VMI for men only, has failed to provide any 
"comparable single-gender women's institution ... Instead, the Commonwealth has created a 
VWIL program fairly appraised as a "pale shadow" ofVMI in terms of the range of curricular 
choices and faculty stature, funding, prestige, alumni support and influence" (Id. at 553). 
The Court's analysis in United States v. Virginia implies that when girls are educated apart 
from boys in state educational institutions "separate but comparable" might satisfy the 
constitutional standard. It must be noted, however, that the notion of constitutional "separate but 
comparable" in the context of segregation based on sex should not be confused with the 
unconstitutional "separate but equal" in the context of segregation based on race. The Supreme 
Court made it clear in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) that maintaining separate schools on 
the basis of race was inherently unconstitutional. 
The Court addressed a straightforward issue in Brown (1954): "Does segregation of children 
in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other 
"tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational 
opportunities?" (Id. at 493). The Court answered with a powerful statement: "To separate them 
from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of 
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way 
unlikely ever to be undone" (Id. at 494). 
The evils of segregation based on race may raise concerns about segregation based on sex; 
however, separation based on sex does not impose the same stigma as does separation based on 
race. From a constitutional perspective the two forms of classification are fundamentally 
different. Simply put, there are no meaningful differences between the races, but there are 
meaningful differences between the sexes. The distinction is reflected in the Equal Protection 
Clause analysis, where classifications based on race are subjected to the very demanding strict 
scrutiny test, while classifications based on sex are subject to the less-demanding heightened 
scrutiny test. 
The Court's broad discussion in United States v. Virginia (1996) supports the proposition that 
"separate but comparable" in respect to separating students by sex would be constitutional if in 
fact the schools and programs provided to both were truly comparable. The Court had the 
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opportunity, as it did in Brown, to simply find that "separate but equal" was constitutionally 
impermissible, but it did not. Instead, after determining that excluding women from VMI 
violated the principles of Equal Protection, the Court engaged in a point-by-point comparison of 
VWIL and VMI and finally determined that because the two institutions were not comparable, 
excluding women from VMI was not permissible. 
Had the Court found that VMIL provided opportunities for women comparable to those VMI 
provided for men, it may have concluded that the Constitutional requirements for equal 
protection had been met. If separation by sex is inherently unconstitutional, as is separation by 
race, the Court arguably would not have engaged in its lengthy point-by-point analysis 
comparing the two Virginia schools. But the Court did compare the two schools and their 
programs, thus opening the door to the possibility that "separate but comparable" in the context 
of single-sex schools and classrooms are constitutionally permissible. 
K-12 Education 
There have been few caSes involving single-sex public elementary and secondary education, 
but two federal court decisions serve to illustrate the judicial approach to the issues involved. 
These two courts arrived at different results, but the cases involved different sets of pertinent 
facts. 
The first case was Vorchheimer v. School District a/Philadelphia (1976) and was decided by 
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The court held that a school district board, in a system 
otherwise coeducational, could maintain a limited number of single-sex high schools in which 
enrollment was voluntary and the educational opportunities offered to girls and boys were 
essentially equal. 
The plaintiff in Vorchheimer (1976) was a female student who alleged unconstitutional 
discrimination because she was denied admission into an all-male high school. Although she was 
eligible to attend Girls High, an all-girls college preparatory high school, the student decided she 
wanted to attend the all-male counterpart, Central High School. Both schools offered an equally 
stringent education, with comparable academic facilities, similar alumni achievements and 
historical connections, and similar rates of graduate placements into prestigious universities. The 
plaintiff presented no factual reasons for her desire to attend Central High School rather than 
Girls High, and she admitted that after her visit she simply did not like the impression that the 
all-girls school gave her. After trial, the district court found the gender-based classification at the 
two schools to lack a fair and substantial relationship to the board's legitimate interest and 
enjoined the practice. The defendant school district appealed. 
The court of appeals summarized the parties' positions: 
1. the school district had chosen to make available on a voluntary basis the time-honored 
alternative of single-sex high schools; 
2. the schools for boys and girls were comparable in quality, academic standing, and 
prestige; 
3. the plaintiff preferred to go to the boys' school because of its academic reputation and her 
personal reaction to Central High School. She submitted no factual evidence that 
attendance at Girls High would constitute psychological or other injury; 
4. the deprivation asserted is that of the opportunity to attend a specific school, not the 
deprivation of an opportunity to obtain an education at a school with comparable 
academic facilities, faculty, and prestige. 
The court of appeals looked first to federal statutory law to determine if the issues could be 
resolved on that basis. The court found that Title IX excluded from its coverage the admission 
policies of secondary schools. The court also considered the implications of the Equal 
Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, but found that legislation to be equivocal. Concluding 
that no federal statutes authoritatively addressed the problem, the court turned to the 
constitutional issue that had prompted the federal court to order that qualified female students be 
admitted to the all-male high school. 
In addressing the Equal Protection Clause issue, the court of appeals noted that in each of the 
Supreme Court cases reviewed by the district court there was an actual deprivation of a benefit to 
a female that could not be obtained elsewhere; in none of these cases was there a situation in 
which equal opportunity was extended to each sex or in which the restriction applied to both. 
And, none had occurred in an educational setting. 
The Vorchheimer (1977) court stated its view about the pertinent educational issue involved 
in the case: 
Equal educational opportunities should be available to both sexes in any intellectual field. 
However, the special emotional problems of the adolescent years are matters of human 
experience and have led some educational experts to opt for one-sex high schools. While this 
policy has limited acceptance on its merits, it does have its basis in a theory of equal benefit 
and not discriminatory denial. (Id. at 887). 
The court noted that the Supreme Court had ruled on one gender-based school admissions 
policy by affirming a district court decision that a state system including both co-educational and 
single-sex campuses for both men and women was permissible. Because this case was a 
summary affirmance of a three-judge district court, the court of appeals did not have the benefit 
of the Supreme Court's reasoning, but still gave the result precedential weight (Vorchheimer at 
887). 
The court of appeals summarized its reasoning: 
The record does contain sufficient evidence to establish that a legitimate educational policy 
may be served by utilizing single-sex high schools. The primary aim of any school system 
must be to furnish an education of as high a quality as is feasible. Measures which would 
allow innovation in methods and techniques to achieve that goal have a high degree of 
relevance. Thus, given the objective of a quality education and a controverted, but respected 
theory that adolescents may study more effectively in single-sex schools, the policy of the 
school board here does bear a substantial relationship. (Id. at 887-88). 
The court of appeals stated that it was not necessary to decide whether Vorchheimer required 
application of the rational basis test or the more demanding substantial relationship test, because 
under either test the result would have been the same. The court reversed and remanded, 
concluding that the board regulations establishing single-sex high schools did not offend the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
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The second case was Garrett v. Board of Education of School District of Detroit (1991), 
which was decided by a federal district court. The plaintiffs were girls and their parents seeking 
an injunction prohibiting the opening of all-male "Academies" established by the defendant 
Detroit Board of Education, alleging that the board's action violated both their statutory and 
constitutional rights. 
After struggling for many years with high rates of unemployment, school dropouts, and 
homicides among urban males, the board of education planned to open the Academies as a 
means of addressing some of these issues with different methods than those being used in the 
existing high schools. Male students in the Academies would study not only the traditional 
curriculum offered in coeducational high schools, but would also experience programs on career 
development, test-taking skills, and civic and social responsibilities. Students would also 
participate in a "Rites of Passage" curriculum intended to focus on male growth and esteem 
issues. The male students at these schools would benefit from extended school days, tutoring 
sessions, summer classes, and personal attention from mentors. Parents had to sign a "covenant 
of participation" promising to stay involved in their children's education, and teachers received 
additional training beyond that normally offered within the school system. 
The plaintiffs in Garrett (1991) prevailed on their allegations of violations of both the Equal 
Protection Clause and Title IX. Relying on Hogan (1982), the district court required the Board of 
Education to show that the sex-based classification serves "important governmental objectives 
and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those 
objectives" (Garrett at 1006). The Board's reliance on excluding girls because the Academy's 
were intended for "at-risk" students simply did not make sense. Categorically defining "at-risk" 
students as males did not acknowledge that similar at-risk situations existed for the female 
population. There was no evidence that the educational system was failing urban males because 
females attend schools with males. In fact, the educational system was also failing females. Thus, 
the district court concluded that the application ofthe second prong ofthe Hogan (1982) test to 
the facts at hand made it likely that the plaintiffs would succeed on the constitutional claim. 
The Board attempted to defend against the Title IX (2001) complaint by arguing that Title IX 
excludes from its coverage the admission plans in kindergarten through grade twelve and that its 
legislative history recognized the need for continued experimentation with unique methods of 
education, such as the Academies. The court disagreed with the Board's legislative 
interpretations, stating that the admission plans covered under the exclusion were for historically 
preexisting single sex schools, not newly created ones, such as the Academies. Also, the U.S. 
Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights (OCR) had offered an opinion that seemed to 
suggest that all-male public elementary and secondary schools would violate Title IX (2001). In 
this instance, the court took the OCR opinion to heart and concluded that Title IX prohibited the 
Academies. 
The Title IX analysis in Garrett (1991) seems to be at odds with the language of the statute, 
(see, 20 U.S.C. 1681(a)(1)), the implementing regulations, (see, 34 C.F.R. 106.35(b), 2000), and 
the statement in the OCR guidelines (see, 67 Fed. Reg. 31102, May 8, 2002), that single-sex 
schools are permissible, if there is a comparable opportunity for the excluded sex. The district 
court noted that the school district had hinted that an academy for girls was in the works, but the 
court found that any later attempt to equalize opportunities for girls would not compensate for 
their lost opportunities to learn in the special environment of the academies. 
The district court also addressed an allegation that the academies were prohibited by the 
Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974. Because the only applicable case was easily 
distinguished, the court found that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated probability of success on 
that claim. 
The Garrett (1991) court also found that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that 
Michigan state law did not permit the creation of the academies. The impact of state law on the 
creation of single-sex schools and classrooms could be an important issue where state statutes are 
more prohibitive of any form of sex discrimination than is federal law. 
The Concept of Single-Sex Education 
Much of the impetus for single-sex schooling has originated from some general concerns that 
girls do not fare as well in coeducational settings as do their male peers. There have also been 
claims, however, that boys may do better in a single-sex setting. 
Perceived Problem 
Released in 1992, a report commissioned by the American Association of University Women 
Educational Foundation (AAUW), How Schools Shortchange Girls, presented a compilation of 
research showing that girls were receiving a much different education than boys in coeducational 
public schools. The authors found that girls received less attention than boys, girls received less 
constructive teacher feedback than boys, girls had fewer complex personal interactions with 
instructors, boys received more wait time for responses than girls, and gender bias was prevalent 
in subjects such as math and science. The AAUW authors suggested that current educational 
practices be reviewed in order to best meet the needs of both boys and girls and offered a set of 
recommendations to address what was seen as an inequitable situation. 
A 1999 follow-up report, Gender Gaps: Where Schools Still Fail Our Children, again 
commissioned by the AAUW Educational Foundation, concluded that although improvements 
had been made in attempts to make education more equitable, coeducational public schools were 
still not best meeting the needs of both boys and girls. The number of girls taking math, science, 
and technology courses had increased, closing the gap between male and female enrollees. 
However, girls still outperformed boys on verbal measures in their early years, girls were still 
more adversely affected by dropping out of school, and sex roles and stereotypes were still 
promoted within the classroom. 
Single-sex schools for girls have been proposed as a possible remedy. Sadker & Sadker 
(1994) reported that girls in single-sex schools enjoyed greater academic opportunities, including 
an increased sense of freedom, the encouragement of young women's voices, and a fostering of 
more confident and independent young women. Girls in single-sex schools also exhibited higher 
self-esteem, enrolled in more math and science courses, and pursued male-dominated career 
fields. "They are intellectually curious, serious about their studies, and achieve more" (p. 233). 
Anecdotal research may shed insight into the personal nature and responses to single-sex 
education. Carstensen's (1999) qualitative research examined the experiences of both teachers 
and students in two private schools for girls in Honolulu. She reported through their own words 
the lack of fear and the ability to find a stronger, more independent voice, one that is often lost to 
the more aggressive nature of the boys in the classroom. She found a "female energy" that 
created an environment of excitement and exuberance and a sense of a cohesive community. 
Some teachers and students compared it to compassion and a sense of caring, describing the 
overwhelming feeling of freedom and the ability to express one's true self without having to 
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worry about the confines of society. One participant noted, "For me, I think that the female 
energy we see is the school offering the opportunity for the girls to find who they are and to find 
their own voice ... You can be yourself. You don't have to be that image you put on when you go 
to school" (Carstensen, 1999, p. 98). 
But boys have their own set of problems in school. Sadker & Sadker (1994) found that boys 
received lower report card grades than girls, were nine times more likely to suffer higher 
academic stress levels, were more likely to be recommended to special education programs, and 
were more likely to be punished for misbehavior. 
As noted in Gender Gaps (AAUW, 1999), boys were less likely than girls to enroll in fine 
arts, foreign languages, advanced English electives, and other humanities courses and when they 
did, they tended to underperform girls. Additionally, fewer boys than girls were involved in 
gifted programs. 
Proposed Solution 
Given the differences many studies have found between the educational needs of boys and 
girls, separation of the sexes would seem to be a logical solution. Caplice (1994) summarized 
some of the education policy arguments by identifying three primary state interests furthered by 
single-sex education: excellence in education, a self-confident citizenry with well-developed 
leadership skills, and system-wide diversity in education. 
Gurian, Henley, and Trueman (2002), whose studies include research into how the brain 
functions, explained how boys and girls learn differently and what schools might do to create the 
ultimate classroom for both boys and girls. They proposed that, especially at the middle school 
level, separate-sex education offers one of a number of possibilities for educational 
improvement. This approach would not harm children, as they are already naturally inclined 
toward separating by sex and could potentially help children who are not learning as well as they 
might in the naturally gender-competitive environment of coeducation. Also, there are examples 
from schools where students are separated by sex in the lunchroom or during in-school 
suspension where educators have noted fewer behavior problems. 
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (2001) expressed her belief in the merits of single-sex 
education. She stated that "[ s ]tudy after study has demonstrated that girls and boys in single-sex 
schools are academically more successful and ambitious than their co-educational counterparts" 
(p. 1076). 
Hutchison (2001) also cited a newspaper column in which the columnist had noted that while 
the benefits of single-sex education for boys have been less well-documented, there is at least 
anecdotal evidence that boys' schools in the inner cities, where discipline is stressed and positive 
male role models emphasized, may result in lower dropout rates and higher test scores. 
Proponents of single-sex education have their own organization and website, the National 
Organization for Single-Sex Public Education, at <www.singlesexschools.org>. The view of this 
organization is that both boys and girls have special educational needs that may be best met in a 
single-sex educational environment. 
Opposition 
The enthusiasm for single-sex public school education has not been shared by all. The 
challenges to single-sex public education come from many sources: women's groups, 
educational organizations, parents, students, and lawyers. Stabiner (2002) noted the struggles of 
the New York Public School System to open the Young Women's Leadership School, which was 
committed to offering a demanding single-sex curriculum. But complaints came from the New 
York Civil Liberties Union, the New York Civil Rights Coalition, and the National Organization 
of Women, contending that any admission that girls may need to be educated in a different 
manner than boys would be detrimental to the women's rights movement and would hinder the 
cause of gender equality. The school did open as planned the fall of 1996. 
Some opposition to single-sex education and to the proposed changes in the Title IX 
regulations come from unlikely sources. The National Coalition for Women and Girls in 
Education (2002) responded to the Secretary of Education's Notice oflntent to Regulate with a 
letter of opposition, citing a lack of clarity as to the rationale for the proposed changes. The 
Coalition argued that the research on single-sex education is "inconclusive, largely anecdotal, 
and based on private and parochial schools, not public schools." Additionally, it incorporated the 
findings in the AAUW 1998 report, Separated by Sex, which reported that single-sex education 
works for some students, but not for all, and that the long-term effects of single-sex education are 
simply unknown. The Coalition also stated that it "does not believe that Title IX should be 
altered in the name of developing an education program that mayor may not be beneficial to 
students' ability to learn in public education" (National Coalition for Women and Girls in 
Education, 2002). 
A result of roundtable discussion, Separated by Sex produced a mixed response about the 
merits of single-sex education. Researchers who had studied the issues came to a consensus on 
six points: (a) There is no conclusive evidence that single-sex education is better than 
coeducation; (b) Policymakers and educators need to continue working to define the parts of a 
"good education;" (c) Single-sex education does produce positive results for some students in 
some settings; (d) Long-term impact of single-sex education is unknown; (e) No education 
environment is a complete escape from sexism; and (f) Investigating single-sex programs 
requires consideration of outside factors that makes each single-sex situation unique, from the 
type of program, type of school, to type of students enrolled. 
Thus, even the AAUW, an organization that early on promoted single-sex education, seemed 
to step back from its original stance and acknowledge that all students can benefit from 
education reform. The issue of improving education was not limited to helping only girls or only 
boys, but focused on an overall education reform that could benefit all students in all schools, 
whether coeducational or single-sex. 
Caplice (1994) pointed out that the well-informed advocate of single-sex schooling should 
also consider common criticisms of this form of education such as: 
1. While single-sex education may be an admirable and viable educational alternative to 
coeducation, the state should not pay for the option because it involves state-supported 
gender separation. 
2. Single-sex schooling does not prepare students for a coeducational world. 
3. If the market does not provide for this form of education, apparently there is no demand 
for it. 
4. While single-sex education may be beneficial, it is only beneficial for women, not men. 
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Comparable or Equal 
There is an important distinction between "comparable" and "equa1." Meg Moulton, Director 
of the National Coalition of Girls Schools, in a "thoughtful letter" (cited in Hutchison, 2001), 
explained the distinction. Regarding Hutchison's effort to allow federal funds to be used for 
"comparable" single-sex programs for both boys and girls, Moulton wrote: 
While the distinction [between "comparable" and "equal"] may be subtle, we feel the 
implications are profound, to the degree that the intent of this section of the bill would be 
virtually nullified if [equal] is adopted ... at the very heart of the impetus to create single-sex 
schooling opportunities is the well-established fact that boys and girls often exhibit unique 
learning styles ... To state that these settings must be equal in all respects is, simply put, 
illogica1. (Hutchison, 2001, p. 1080) 
Given the language in the Title IX regulations, (see, 34 C.F.R. 106.35(b), 2002), and the 
Court's apparent search in u.s. v. Virginia (1996) for "comparability" in the programs offered by 
VWIL and VMI, the distinction between "comparable" and "equal" is indeed important. If all 
aspects of separate schools or classes for boys and girls are the same, the educational logic for 
the separation would rest only on the simple fact of keeping the sexes apart. The research 
suggests that there are meaningful differences between boys and girls that should be addressed 
by corresponding differences in the education that is provided. 
The No Child Left Behind Act, Title IX, 
and the Equal Protection Clause: Uncharted Waters 
The No Child Left Behind Act of2001 has opened the door for "innovative programs," 
including single-sex schools and classrooms. Those who see such an arrangement as a promising 
educational option will now have the additional incentive of federal funding. As noted in the Act, 
however, such schools must be consistent with applicable law. 
Neither Title IX nor current federal regulations and guidelines categorically prohibit single-
sex schools and classrooms. Given the support of the Department of Education for the No Child 
Left Behind Act, If and when new Title IX regulations are promulgated, they are likely to clarify 
how single-sex schools and classrooms may be organized and operated so as to be consistent 
with the requirements of federal law. 
The Constitution does not prohibit all classifications based on gender. But single-sex schools 
and classrooms would be subject to challenge under the Equal Protection Clause, and states and 
school districts may be called upon to justify keeping boys and girls apart. The state would be 
required to show that such a sex-based classification serves an important governmental purpose 
and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those 
objectives. Defendants could cite the research showing that single-sex schools and classrooms 
provide benefits for both boys and girls; plaintiffs could argue, however, that the research is 
inconclusive. 
Those who would establish single-sex schools or classrooms may be confronted with legal 
challenges and should be prepared to testify about the educational rationale for such an 
arrangement. As in many areas of education law, courts generally look with favor upon 
educational policies and practices that are grounded in educational research and professional 
judgement. If school officials can demonstrate that both boys and girls have comparable 
educational opportunities, then such single-sex educational settings should not run afoul of 
federal law. 
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